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Until recently economists have not devoted much attention 
to nonprofit organizations (NPOs), although they are present 
in almost all real economic systems and are quantitatively 
significant (see James, 1987, for a worldwide overview, and 
Rudney, 1987, for US data).
Following Hansmann's path-breaking contribution (1980), 
in the last few years several theoretical contributions have 
been presented which have attempted to identify the economic 
role of NPOs, as defined by a "nondistribution constraint" 
i-e- the prohibition to distribute a monetary residual 
to individuals who exercise control over them, such as 
members, officers, directors or trustees (1). (Surveys of 
the literature can be found in: James and Pose-Ackerman,
1986; Hansmann, 1987A; Gui, 1987; Holtmann, 1988).
In this paper, in order to clarify the specific role of 
NPOs, I examine and classify private organizations by 
focusing on the one hand on the desired pattern of surplus 
distribution, and on the other on the attribution of 
decision making power, as specified in the organization's 
statutes- This leads to the crucial distinction between 
"mutual benefit" and "public benefit" organizations, that 
is based on coincidence and, respectively, non coincidence 
between those who exert ultimate control (the "dominant" 
group) with the designed receivers of the organization's 
surplus (the "beneficiary" group). After discussing why a 
category should play the beneficiary role, I then 
investigate the reasons for adopting either the mutual 
benefit or the public benefit option- This theoretical 
framework allows for a thorough understanding of NPOs and 
for a comparison to be made with cooperatives and 
capitalist firms-
In section II I summarize three views on the specific 
functions of NPOs- In section III I focus on the 
distribution of surplus in economic organizations, of which 
I present a general classification based on the attribution 
of the dominant and the beneficiary roles- In section IV I 
examine the reasons for this attribution- The functions of 
the nondistribution constraint in public benefit and mutual 
benefit organizations are discussed in sections V and VI 





















































































































































































II. The functions of NPOs as compared with other private 
organizat ions•
In his seminal article Hansmann presents NPOs as a 
"...response to a particular kind of "market failure", 
specifically the inability to police producers by ordinary 
contractual devices..." (1980, p-845). He terms this 
situation "contract failure" and defines it more 
specifically as the customers' inability to: (a) compare 
products and prices before buying; (b) reach a clear and 
detailed agreement with the supplier; (c) enforce such an 
agreement. However, in the following sections of the article 
and in subsequent works on the subject (1985A, 1985B) 
Hansmann seems to restrict contract failure to informational 
asymmetry.
When contract failure is present the nondistribution 
constraint, by reducing the producer's incentive to exploit 
its advantageous situation, would indirectly protect both 
customers and donors- This general claim is better assessed 
by looking at the various types of NPOs- Hansmann classifies 
them according to two criteria: i) the major source of 
income, whether donations or purchases; ii) the assignment 
of ultimate control, whether to a board of trustees or to a 
membership formed by those contributing to the 
organization's income (2). In such a way he obtains four 
types of NPOs, which he examines separately (see his double 
entry table)-
Hansmann maintains that his contract failure theory does 
not hold with one of these types of NPOs: those selling 
goods and services to their own members, which he 
practically identifies with social clubs- These, he argues, 
are established to counter a different market failure, i-e- 
monopoly power- In fact, if the club were managed by an 
entrepreneur, the particular attractiveness of the club that 
derives from the peculiar identities of co-members would 
turn him into a virtual monopolist, and customer 
exploitation would result. Therefore, he continues, social 
clubs should rather be registered as cooperatives, which he 
sees as the appropriate organizational response to sellers' 
market power- The fact that in US they are registered as 
NPOs would be explained, instead, by tax advantages and by 




























































































Hansmann's "contract failure" theory is essentially 
accepted and developed by several authors; in particular 
Easley and O'Hara provide a formal treatment of his claims 
(1983, 1986). A more critical view has been taken by Ellman 
(1982), who proposes, instead, a theoretical distinction 
between "donative" and "mutual benefit" NPOs, which he sees 
as protecting respectively donors' and customers’ goals. 
Ellman asserts that customers are not significantly 
affected by contract failure, an extreme position that he 
ends up contradicting (3). More interestingly, he affirms 
that in the mutual benefit case the crucial point is that of 
allowing customers to exert control in order to obtain a 
"special quality".
Regarding the role of the nondistribution constraint in 
the mutual benefit case, Ellman suggests that it prevents 
the formation of a class of investors that would push the 
organization to pursue their particular interests (1982, p. 
1036). Finally, as to the relation with cooperatives, Ellman 
is in favour of maintaining an economic and juridical 
distinction between the two. His position rests on rather 
vague arguments, essentially based on the great diversity 
between, say, an agricultural marketing cooperative and a 
sporting club, the former being established to secure high 
prices to producers while the latter to secure high quality 
to consumers (see pp. 1048 - 1049).
A third view is expressed by Ben Ner (1986), who sees 
NPOs merely as a form of backward integration on the part of 
consumers- In order to identify their role, he discusses how 
consumer organizations can improve consumers' welfare in 
three situations of market failure due to quality problems:
i) consumers who are less informed than producers; ii) a 
monopolist that both undersupplies quantity by exploiting 
its power over price and chooses an inefficient quality 
level; iii) a monopolist that produces an excludable public 
good and is unable to price-discriminate between 
heterogeneous consumers.
As to the relation between NPOs and consumer 
cooperatives, Ben Ner focuses on the absence of capital 
shares in the former, which removes the risk of power 
concentration in the hands of a few investors- On the other 
hand, he continues, the nondistribution constraint entails 




























































































consumer-members is concerned, which can be an obstacle to 
allocative efficiency (the constraint might render the 
maximization of consumers' surplus incompatible with the 
maximization of the joint surplus of consumers and producer; 
see pp- 95 - 96).
In the following sections I assess the claims described 
here by providing an unified treatment of a large range of 
private organizations and of their specific functions.
III. The distribution of the organization's surplus: public 
benefit versus mutual benefit organizations-
In the following by the term organization I will refer 
to a fictitious person that is distinct from all the agents 
that are involved in its activity and, furthermore, does 
not include any of them- An exception is made for the 
directors, who are considered as the executors of the 
organization's will and are therefore identified with the 
organization itself (4). The considerations that follow are 
more relevant in the case of large, formal organizations, in 
which the various functions are played jointly by many 
agents.
If we exclude unlimited accumulation of wealth or 
resource dissipation as goals, any economic organization 
(NPOs included) pursues a distributive goal -- i- e. aims 
at devoting in some form or other its surplus to the benefit 
of a "beneficiary" group, that may be formed alternatively 
of members of functional categories such as buyers, 
consumers of nonexcludable goods, aid recipients, workers, 
sellers, and investors (5). Notice that, among the various 
interests of the beneficiaries, the organization is not 
usually aimed at promoting all of them, but only some -- 
often just one —  "privileged" interests (for instance in 
worker cooperatives security of employment and/or high 
salaries are usually privileged with respect to high 
remuneration of worker-members' capital shares). Statutes 
also specify the "dominant" group, that is awarded the 
ultimate decision making power over the organization. The 




























































































already listed with reference to the beneficiary role; here, 
however, we must include also donors and trustees (i- e. 
directors not directly accountable to any of the other 
categories of agents involved with the organization). The 
dominant role may be assigned to only a fraction of the 
agents that perform a certain function in the organization 
(i. e. of a certain category); the same can happen as to the 
beneficiary role (6).
The nondistribution constraint, as defined above, 
exclusively refers to "explicit" forms of distribution of an 
organization's surplus (such as dividends or bonuses). 
However, distribution can occur also in "implicit" form, 
either overtly or covertly (think respectively of favourable 
prices for members and unduly generous non monetary 
benefits to managers).
Since implicit distribution occurs before the 
determination of the "accounting" surplus -- that is the 
object of explicit distributive decisions —  in order to 
discuss distributive decisions in a broad sense, one can 
refer to the "potential" surplus, that is the maximum 
surplus the organization as such might obtain in case in all 
its transactions, including those with the beneficiary 
group, it pursued its own interest (7). This would mean, for 
example, that the organization exploits its possible market 
power or informational advantage also in dealing with the 
beneficiary group or with and donors. It is the potential 
surplus that the organization is statutorily bound to 
devote to the beneficiary group, by either distributing it 
explicitly (if permitted) or surrendering it in the form of 
implicit distribution- Both forms of distribution can occur 
either immediately or with a delay, i. e. after 
accumulation. Although the potential surplus is a pre- 
distribution concept, its value is likely to depend on the 
assignment of both the dominant and the beneficiary role, to 
the extent that these affect the behaviour of transacting 
partners (or, equivalently, transaction costs). However, the 
concept can be made operational case by case by means of 
precise assumptions (an example is developed in Gui, 1988).
Implicit distribution is not a zero sum transfer- In 
fact, by modifying either the price or the quality of 
transactions with the beneficiaries, it affects their 
allocative decisions. Therefore, apart from administrative 




























































































due to implicit distribution can either be smaller or 
greater than the corresponding decrease in the 
organization's accounting surplus, depending on whether the 
resulting allocation is farther or nearer from that implied 
by the maximization of their joint surplus than was the 
previous allocation (8).
Organizations can be classified according to the economic 
functions played in the organization by the dominant group 
and by the beneficiary group, respectively, as in table 1
(9). The cases on the main diagonal can be designated as 
"mutual benefit", since the beneficiary and the dominant 
groups coincide: the firm is established to benefit the 
dominant group (via some privileged interest, not specified 
in the table), remaining cells can be labeled "public 
benefit" (10) . They are characterized by noncoincidence 
between the dominant and the beneficiary group (11).
As the table shows, the only relevant "public benefit" 
cells belong to the last column, in which the dominant role 
is assigned either to trustees or to donors- The table 
immediately suggests that categories other than consumers 
can be the beneficiaries not only of mutual benefit 
organizations —  whether under the cooperative, the 
nonprofit or other legal formats -- but also of public 
benefit organizations. This is worth stressing since the 
attention of researchers in the economics of NPOs has been 
confined to organization intended to benefit either 
consumers or aid recipients.
IV. Why should a category be the beneficiary and why should 
the public or the mutual benefit option be preferred?
The first question to be asked is why a category should 
be established as the beneficiary of an organization acting 
as partner in a certain type of transaction. When should 
such an option be preferred by the members of the category 
(or by someone else on their behalf) to transacting with 
organizations having other beneficiary categories?




























































































organization having previously another beneficiary category 
is reorganized to benefit the category under consideration. 
Then let us look at the possible increases in welfare 
directly accruing to the latter (12). Several situations are 
conceivable, which are listed below. (In reality mixtures of 
these situations can be found).
1) Organizations having other beneficiary categories would 
exert ordinary market power to the detriment of the 
category under consideration (13). Similarly, where 
transacting entails a significant accumulation of specific 
assets on the part of the category's members, dealing with 
an organization with conflicting interests would expose the 
former to ex-post monopoly on the part of the latter in the 
form of opportunistic attempts to appropriate a 
disproportionate share of the quasi-rent of these assets 
(14).
2) The market for the "privileged" transaction is such that 
some members of the category would be either rationed or 
prevented from establishing long lasting contractual 
relationships. Then an organization aimed at providing these 
agents stable transaction opportunities represents from 
their point of view an appropriate response- (This applies 
particularly well to workers).
3) There is informational asymmetry as at least one 
important characteristic of the transaction (let us call it 
quality), with the category's members the less informed 
party. This informational asymmetry damages the members of 
the category in two ways. First, they may engage in 
transactions that they would refuse if better informed (i. 
e. whose quality is below the member's reservation level for 
the agreed price). Second, they may refuse mutually 
advantageous transactions because they do not trust the 
organization. (Notice that in case b the organization is 
also damaged by informational asymmetry (15) ). This is a 
typical situation to which Hansmann applies his concept of 
"contract failure" (16).
4) There is asymmetrical information of the same type as in 
situation 3, but now the less informed party is the 
organization (to be more precise, the members of the 
category are more informed than outsiders not only about 
their own situation and behavior, but also about their 




























































































gives the category's members an incentive to cooperate in 
both disclosing information regarding co-members and 
monitoring their actions so as to reduce transaction costs 
(17).
5) Adequate satisfaction of the preferences of the 
category's members as to the various characteristics of the 
transaction -- the same for all the members -- cannot be 
assured through market relationships, due to one or more of 
the following reasons: the number of different "bundles of 
characteristics" offered on the market is smaller than the 
number of characteristics, which prevents a market price for 
each characteristic from being implicitly determined (18); 
the true characteristics of transactions and their 
conformity with one's own preferences are known only by 
direct experience, while both writing complete contingent 
contracts and interrupting an ongoing contractual 
relationship entail high costs; new occurrences call for 
frequent readjustments of characteristics- Provided its 
members are sufficiently homogeneous, elimination of the 
conflict of interest between the organization and the 
category's members eases the maintenance of a stricter 
conformity of characteristics to preferences (conflict 
prevents the "voice" of beneficiaries having a more direct 
influence over the organization's choices; see Krashinsky, 
1986, p- 123). This is the situation of consumers searching 
for a "special quality", as stressed by Ellman (19).
6) The transaction concerns an excludable public good- 
Allocative efficiency can be improved by better knowledge as 
to the willingness to pay of the category's members, that is 
the magnitude according to which price discrimination 
should be shaped- Elimination of interest conflicts between 
the category and the organization reduces the reluctance of 
individuals to reveal their demands, while horizontal 
monitoring by colleague beneficiaries can reinforce the 
effect. Price discrimination can even take the form of 
voluntary contributions above a base fee (20).
7) The category is constituted of consumers of a 
nonexcludable public good, so that recourse to individual 
action would lead to underprovision or even no provision at 
all. Provided some members of the category are ready to 
voluntarily contribute in order to cover the costs borne by 
an organization that offers to produce the good, they would 



























































































category, due to the prohibitively high costs of 
ascertaining whether their individual contributions are 
correctly used, rather than simply pocketed by that category
(2 1 ).
8) The category is constituted of intended recipients of aid 
and therefore is the beneficiary by definition.
In situations 3, 4, 5 and 6 there is an efficiency case
for the category's members being the beneficiaries. By 
coordinating their actions the category and the organization 
can obtain a greater surplus than by acting separately. In 
situation 8 the reason for assigning the beneficiary role is 
to redistribute surplus- In situation 7 both reasons hold- 
Similarly, in situations 1 and 2 both efficiency and 
redistribution come into play; however, in situation 2 
redistribution may occur not only at the expense of an 
alternative beneficiary category, but also of other members 
of the same category that are not included in the
beneficiary group. As already noticed, in all situations 
part of the gain can be lost when implicit distribution 
takes place.
Obviously, besides the above listed advantages of being the 
beneficiary, there are disadvantages that have to be taken 
into consideration. First of all, depriving another 
category of the beneficiary role may entail an efficiency 
loss. Secondly, attached to the beneficiary role is a 
greater risk to be borne by the category's members- In this 
regard note that individual beneficiaries can be sheltered 
from risk by using the accounting surplus as a buffer 
against variability in the potential surplus, but only up to 
a certain point- In the worst occurrences the terms of 
their transactions with the organization necessarily 
deteriorate- However, to the extent that beneficiaries are 
free to refuse to transact with the organization without 
incurring significant penalties, an anusual share of risk 
ends by being borne by other categories (typically 
financiers); therefore, the cost of risk often takes the 
form of less favourable terms of transaction with such 
categories (22). Thirdly, since the dominant role will also 
have to be reassigned (either to the beneficiaries 
themselves or to trustees or donors) the cost of control 





























































































Naturally, beside the assignment of the beneficiary role 
to the category, there exist other responses to the market 
failures examined, both within the private sector (cost-plus 
contracts, professionalism, ..) and with the intervention of 
public authorities (see Hansmann, 1980, sect. VII; 
Krashinsky, 1986, pp. 116-117).
Linked to the previous question is a further question: 
once the category under exam is established as the 
beneficiary of the organization, who is going to play the 
dominant role and why? In other words, for what reasons 
should an organization established to serve a certain 
category adopt the public benefit or the mutual benefit 
form?
In general it can be said that control on the part of 
beneficiaries can assure a stricter conformity of the 
organization's activity to its established goals, due to 
both information and incentives considerations. Exceptions 
to this general statement are found in situation 8; the 
beneficiaries might not give priority, among their own 
interests, to those the donors have established as 
privileged (an obvious example is the tendency to devote to 
immediate consumption resources intended to improve 
education or health care). Secondly, control can be 
desirable per se, either on the part of the beneficiaries as 
an opportunity for personal and social advancement, or on 
the part of outside promoters as a strategy to make the 
members of the beneficiary group feel more responsible 
(24).
On the other hand, the mutual benefit solution can be 
hindered by the costs of collective action (especially in 
setting up the organization (25), but also during the 
subsequent operations). The elements that influence such 
costs include among others: group homogeneity and cohesion; 
number of members; transaction costs connected with 
distance and frequency or continuity of transactions; value 
of transactions of individual members; lack of cultural 
requirements on the part of beneficiaries (26).
This argument does not imply that when such costs are 
high the job of serving the interests of the category will 
be taken on by a public benefit organization, since this 
requires the willingness on the part of someone else to 



























































































Furthermore, a public benefit governance of the 
organization also entails specific costs, stemming from lack 
of economic incentives to monitor performance (27).
In particular, in three of the situations listed above -- 
numbers 4, 5, and 6 -- in order to reap fully the advantage 
of being the beneficiaries the members of the category must 
accomplish some actions- This is more likely to occur if the 
category's members exert direct control over the 
organization, i. e. also play the dominant role- The 
importance of having "residual rights of control" (28) seems 
to be especially great in situation 4, while in situations 5 
and 6 some forms of consultation might also be effective-
In situation 7, if the category is large and membership 
is not compulsory (29), control by beneficiaries necessarily 
involves only some of them, so that a neat mutual benefit 
response is nearly impossible. In some cases whether the 
organization has to be seen as public benefit or as mutual 
benefit is not obvious (30). On the contrary, neat public 
benefit responses are possible (an example are NPOs engaged 
in environmental activities). Also in situation 2 the 
mutual benefit solution seems fitter, due to both the 
conformity and the responsibility arguments-
In the case of aid recipients (situation 8), the 
arguments related to insufficient cultural requirements, 
lack of group cohesion, and possible differences between 
donors and beneficiaries in defining the privileged interest 
seem to reinforce each other so that nearly all charitable 
organizations are controlled either by donors or by 
trustees. Some exceptions are found especially in 
development aid, where one can find more or less informal 
organizations of recipients set up to allocate among 
themselves goods or money received from developed countries- 
Such an arrangement can be explained partly by the 
responsibility argument and partly by the costs of 
administering the allocation of aid among recipients on the 
part of a funding organization that is located thousands of 
kilometers apart and has insufficient knowlegde of local 
language, habits and so on.
As to situations, in which market power is the crucial 
issue, none of the arguments above is decisive in favour of 
either solution; the same can be said of situation 3, 



























































































Possible reasons which might explain the dominance of the 
mutual benefit form in the former case and of the public 
benefit form in the latter are to be found elsewhere: in the 
participatory (rather than paternalistic) orientation of 
promoters of organizations intended to improve the economic 
situations of large interest groups (such as working class 
consumers); in the more explicit charitable nature of 
organizations serving privileged interests such as health 
care or education, and therefore in a greater role of 
philantropy in their formation and financing; in the fact 
that contract failure is usually associated with less 
homogeneous interests than market power, which renders 
control on the part of beneficiaries more costly; in that , 
in order for market power to significantly hurt an 
individual, the volume of his transactions in that market 
mus be large -- and therefore the costs of control 
relatively small —  while with contract failure this is not 
necessarily so; and so on.
V. Public interest organizations and the
nond i st r i but ion constraint.
It is clear that the dedication of public benefit 
organizations to serve a privileged interest not pertaining 
to the dominant group has to be particularly protected- 
The prohibition to distribute explicitly the accounting 
surplus to non-beneficiary groups (such as managers, 
trustees, or employees) is therefore a necessary protection- 
However, it is not sufficient to ensure the compliance of 
actual distributive decisions with the statutory ends, due 
to the possibility that the potential surplus be either 
distributed in implicit form to non-beneficiaries or 
channelled to the service of other interests than either the 
founders established or the donors intend to support (32). 
This renders it advisable that the nondistribution 
constraint be reinforced by strict rules limiting the 
discretion of decision makers.
As stressed by Hansmann, asymmetrical information with 
the organization the more informed party is doubtless 




























































































constraint in public benefit NPOs. First of all, as to 
beneficiaries, in situation 3 asymmetrical information is 
the reason for granting them a particular protection. 
Secondly, the nondistribution constraint also protects 
donors, this peculiar category whose interests by definition 
overlap with those of beneficiaries and that is nearly 
always affected by asymmetrical information-
In fact, the difference between these two situations is 
only one of degree, since uninformed beneficiaries resemble 
donors (see Hansmann, 1980, p. 872-73). An example is when 
the recipient is distinct from the buyer, so the latter 
remains partly uninformed even after the purchase (take for 
instance children's education or old parents' nursing care) 
(33). However, even when information asymmetry disappears 
ex-post consumers may be in a weak position; this is 
particularly true if the purchase is a crucial one (e-g- an 
esoteric treatment in a psychiatric clinic), and for any 
reason legal action does not represent an effective 
protection (this happens for instance if the characteristics 
of the purchase are not clearly specified in advance).
Informational asymmetry is not the only reason for 
imposing the nondistribution constraint in public benefit 
organizations; rather, I would agree with Hansmann's initial 
claim that the more general concept of contract failure is 
to be considered (see in particular conditions b and c in 
the definition presented in section II). In fact, even if 
those who deal with the organization (especially donors) are 
members, or anyhow are well-informed, the constraint still 
represents a guarantee to them- In fact, information apart, 
there are costs in writing and enforcing a detailed 
contract specifying the obligations of the organization- 
Therefore, the exclusion of distribution to the dominant 
group has some value even to a well informed member (the 
nondistribution constraint can be seen as a standard 
contract a la Posner; see Krashinsky, 1986, p. 116) (34).
As suggested in section IV, it may be that public benefit 
organizations represent a response to unfavourable prices, 
not quality problems- This seems to be, at least in part, 
the role played by NPOs providing housing at low prices 
(either to families or to students), or managing thrift 
shops, youth hostels, cheap food services and so on- In 
these cases prices contain an element of rent -- not 




























































































intends to turn to consumers- It is to be stressed, however, 
that even in this case the rationale for the 
nondistribution constraint is contract failure- In fact, its 
effect is to render the organization more trustworthy to 
donors, not to beneficiaries (who do not need particular 
assurances, due to the nature of goods purchased). This 
assertion holds true even if no current donation is 
received, as is often the cases in the above examples- In 
fact, by definition, in public benefit organizations the 
donative element is never absent, since they owe their 
existence to an initial donation, at least of 
entrepreneurial resources, that the founders devote to a 
non self-regarding privileged interest, both in the present 
and in the future.
An important question that remains to be answered is why 
very few examples can be found in which the interests of 
beneficiary categories different from consumers and aid 
recipients are promoted in the public benefit mode, i- e- 
by a nondistribution constraint rather than by active 
participation- One reason is that both sellers and workers 
are usually much more specialized than consumers in their 
transactions qua sellers or workers. Thus, transactions with 
an organization created to forward their interests of 
sellers or workers would account for a significant -share of 
all their transactions. Furthermore the relationship with 
such organization would be either a continuous or a repeated 
one- All this reduces the costs (in relation to the value of 
transactions or even in absolute terms) of beneficiaries 
starting and controlling the organization. A second reason 
is that these functions in most cases define the 
professional status of the agents themselves, which on the 
one hand provides a further stimulus to playing an active 
role and on the other exposes a non participatory response 
to the charge of paternalism-
The second reason suggested above helps us to explain why 
organizations aimed at benefitting workers often adopt, at 
least formally, a participatory statute even in cases in 
which the beneficiaries play no role in starting them and a 
minor one in controlling them- This is the case, for 
example, of worker cooperatives formed in US during the 
Great Depression to engage unemployed labourers in public 
works. The same can be said of worker cooperatives that 
exclude any remuneration of capital shares and limit wages 




























































































surplus to providing a job for handicapped worker-members■ A 
notable exception is represented by those US companies in 
which Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) own the 
majority of shares (even 1 0 0 $ in some cases), but the 
control is in the hands of trustees (35).
Another exception is provided by some voluntary benefit 
organizations aimed at benefitting sellers located in 
particularly disadvantaged communities. A noticeable example 
is the German network of "third world shops" that markets 
handicraft or agricultural products directly shipped from 
selected poor areas (36).
So far I have discussed how can the nondistribution 
constraint, that characterizes the nonprofit form, serve the 
statutory goals of a public benefit organization. However, 
it is not surprising that it can also serve other, less 
noble goals. In particular, the absence of residual claims 
frees directors and managers from the control of dominant 
shareholders or from the threat of hostile takeovers (see 
Fama and Jensen, 1983A, p. 319; Hansmann 1985A, sect- 3-6). 
Furthermore, tax advantages of NPOs can allow profit-seeking 
entrepreneurs to appropriate (covertly) more surplus than 
under the legal format of a business corporation (see James, 
1987, p. 403). Notice that, although the public benefit form 
is more apt for pursuing such aims, the mutual benefit form 
lends itselt equally well to such exploitation if member 
participation is known to be ineffective-
VI. Constraints to distribution in mutual benefit 
organizations-
According to table 1 , mutual benefit organizations also 
include those whose members are investors (e. g. joint stock 
companies). These are characterized by the fact that the 
privileged interest is a high return on the wealth 
permanently committed to the organization by its members. 
Since the title to share in the surplus of the organization 
derives from a once and for all contribution, no further 
transaction between the member and the organization is 
required. Each share is then an unconditional claim to the 




























































































"capitalization". In all other mutual benefit typologies, 
instead, in order to enjoy a fraction of the organization's 
surplus, members have to repeatedly perform some activities, 
such as selling or buying from the organization goods or 
services, or even using the facilities of a club- This on 
the one hand leads to the imposition of constraints to the 
saleability of membership rights (colleague members are not 
indifferent as to whom they have to deal with), and on the 
other conditions the appropriation of the future surplus by 
the individual member. Capitalization is therefore hindered- 
In this sense joint stock companies can be called 
"capitalist" (37), as opposed to "noncapitalist" 
organizations such as NPOs and cooperatives (38).
Notice that in cooperatives, that account for a 
significant share of mutual benefit typologies, membership 
-- and therefore decision-making power -- is formally 
attached to the ownership of capital shares, while the 
intended beneficiaries are, say, member-suppliers of milk to 
be processed. However, a further condition for membership in 
the case under exam is to be a milk producer. Moreover, the 
remuneration of capital shares is usually limited and their 
transferability is restricted. Thus, both the dominant and 
the beneficiary roles are in fact assigned to milk 
suppliers.
For what has been said above in joint stock companies by 
definition no overt implicit channel of distribution to 
members should exist. Thus the imposition of constraints to 
distribution conflicts with the mutual benefit aim- In fact, 
when there are constraints, such as in limited dividend 
companies, they are not intended to favour the 
beneficiaries, but to protect other categories (typically 
customers).
As regards "non-capitalistic" types of mutual benefit 
organizations in general, I maintain that the role of a 
strict nondistribution constraint, if any, is less important 
than in public benefit organizations (where it has been 
shown to be necessary —  although not sufficient -- to 
enforce the desired distribution pattern). Instead, it may 
be unnecessarily restrictive and therefore detrimental to 
the organization's activity.
In fact, in mutual benefit organizations, even in the 




























































































group, by also constituting the dominant group, has the 
power to ensure that an explicit distribution of the 
potential surplus to the benefit of other groups does not 
occur- Furthermore, as regards distribution to their own 
benefit, it is not blocked by the nondistribution 
constraint: an implicit distribution of the organization's 
surplus to the benefit of members is still possible, even 
overtly, as is shown for example by cooperatives, in which 
it represents the major channel by which the organization 
benefits its members-
The approach presented in this article can only suggest 
some noncompelling reasons for imposing a nondistribution 
constraint in the mutual benefit case- They come from the 
recognition that the members of the dominant group usually 
have several distinct interests in the organization's 
activity, while in general the organization is not 
established to foster all of them- Thus protection is 
needed against some members pressing the organization to 
pursuing preferentially a different, conflicting interest 
from that statutorily established as privileged.
First of all, the nondistribution constraint blocks 
distribution to investors. However, it seems too drastic a 
response. The cooperative practice (especially in Europe) is 
very eloquent with this regard- In many cases the problem of 
having extraneous investors trying to force the 
organization to pursue their own interest has been solved 
by pressing the members —  primarily involved as customers, 
suppliers or workers, depending on the cases -- to provide 
themselves all or most of the equity capital. If such a 
solution prevents outsiders taking upon the dominant role, 
a dangerous dichotomy of goals among those controlling the 
organization can arise whenever some members' investment is 
significant, while some others' is not- However, in order to 
avoid that the former direct the firm to protect in the 
first place their interests as investors, setting a limit to 
the remuneration of capital shares is a sufficient guarantee 
(such a practice is suggested by the International 
Cooperative Alliance; similarly, nonvoting securities with 
variable but limited yield, called "subventions", are 
explicitly admitted in NPO statutes of Pennsylvania and New 
York States, as reported by Hansmann, 1981 A, p. 564). In 
fact, especially if one considers the event of dissolution, 
the right of recouping at some future time the capital 




























































































to possible contributors than the remuneration of shares 
(39).
Secondly, the nondistribution constraints excludes any 
monetary distribution to members according to their share in 
the volume of "privileged" transactions- In some cases such 
exclusion may be functional to the aims of the organization- 
For example, when the primary interest of member-customers 
is in keeping the quality of their purchases as high as 
possible, the conflicting interest to keep the effective 
price as low as possible (in particular through profit 
distribution according to "patronage") has to be kept under 
control (see Hansmann, 1980, p-889-90). Notice, however, 
that the possibility of members, by means of the internal 
pricing policy, neutralizing such effects of the 
nondistribution constraint, or, viceversa, obtaining the 
same results in the absence of the constraint itself, limits 
the importance of such arguments-
It is to be noticed that a constraint that blocks 
distribution according to "patronage" may be non binding, 
since in many instances monetary distribution is 
uninteresting. For instance, if the volume of transactions 
with the organization is uniformly distributed among members 
and membership is stable, granting members more favorable 
prices in the following year is largely equivalent to an 
immediate distribution of the accounting surplus, and causes 
smaller administrative costs- Similarly, if some self­
financing is required, reinvesting the surplus is likely to 
reduce transaction costs with respect to distributing it 
and, subsequently, collecting capital contributions from 
members themselves.
Another argument against distribution, that arises when 
nonmembers as well as members deal with the organization, 
concerns the fact that members may distribute among 
themselves —  in the form of either price rebates or 
dividends —  an accounting surplus that is partly obtained 
in transacting with the former- Such a practice would be 
questionable in organizations that in a sense are supposed 
to foster the interest of an entire category (Hansmann, 
1981 A, pp 559 - 560). However, also in this case a less 
drastic regulation is sufficient for the purpose (such as 
the prohibition to distribute the share of profits that 
corresponds to transactions with nonmembers, as discussed in 





























































































Focusing on the interest that is established as 
privileged and on the dominant or passive position of the 
designed beneficiary group, as I do in this paper, helps in 
clarifying the economic functions of the various "non­
capital ist ic" private organization and the rationale for 
submitting them to limitations as to surplus distribution, 
as happens in NPOs and, to a lesser extent, also in 
cooperatives■
Several implications arise from this effort of 
clarification. First of all, imposing the nondistribution 
constraint, i. e. adopting the nonprofit form, is only 
important in public benefit organizations, while in mutual 
benefit organization it may even be an unnecessary 
hindrance. Therefore, no substantial distinction in the 
functions played by cooperatives and mutual benefit NPOs can 
be found. (In particular cases it may be advisable that the 
statutes exclude any monetary distribution, but this is an 
internal affair). Second, the nondistribution constraint 
is generally motivated by asymmetrical information on the 
part of both donors and beneficiaries; however, it can also 
serve well-informed donors when enforceability is costly. 
Third, NPOs can also represent a response to unfavourable 
prices and, conversely, cooperatives can also be a response 
to quality problems- Fourth, the beneficiaries of a public 
benefit organizations are not necessarily consumers or aid 
recipients, but may also be workers or sellers. Last, joint 
stock companies can be characterized as "capitalist" with 
respect to both NPOs and cooperatives since their 
beneficiaries are not required to perform any repeated 
transaction with the organization, which eases the 





























































































(1) See James and Rose-Ackerman (1986, p. 4); Hansmann, 
1980, p.838). An alternative definition, typical of the 
German tradition, refers instead to the absence of "... a 
continous productive or speculative activity..." (Verrucoli, 
1985, p. 8-9).
(2) He proposes the labels: "donative" and "commercial" to 
refer to the main source of income; "entrepreneurial” and, 
respectively, "mutual" to refer to control. In this context 
"mutual" stands roughly for "participatory", clearly a 
different meaning from "mutual benefit".
(3) Such a position implies that non member-controlled NPOs 
that are financed by the sale of their services should 
remain outside the analysis (they are neither "donative" 
nor "mutual benefit"), despite the fact that they represent 
the majority of US NPOs (think of hospitals, schools, 
personal services, ••)■ However, in dealing with such 
organizations Ellman inadvertently uses Hansmann's argument 
that customers feel safer if they know that those managing 
the organization cannot profiteer- In fact, on p. 1022 he 
tries to include in his "donative" category a larger group 
of organizations than this label, as opposed to 
"commercial", would suggest, by saying that the voluntary 
submission to the nondistribution constraint can convey a 
message of altruism to potential customers.
(4) For the sake of simplicity the directors' role of 
suppliers of managerial or even monitoring services is 
disregarded. However it could be considered separately.
(5) For convenience, depositors will be treated as buyers 
(of financial assets) and borrowers as sellers.
(6) Examples are voting and nonvoting shares in joint stock 
companies, with the latter only awarded the beneficiary 
role; member (i. e- dominant) and nonmembers donors in 
charitable organizations; member or nonmember customers in 
consumers cooperatives, with the latter excluded from both 
roles; subsidized (ie- beneficiary, typically the students) 
and unsubsidized customers in university cafeterias-




























































































(1 9 8 1 ) .
(8) For example if beneficiaries are consumers and the 
potential surplus is obtained at a price exceeding marginal 
cost, at least up to a certain point implicit distribution 
leads to Pareto-superior allocations (this is the case in 
Hansmann 1981B, where he discusses the effects of donations 
when, due to high fixed costs, average costs are 
significantly higher than marginal costs, as it happens with 
performing arts; a similar configuration of costs is assumed 
also by Holtmann, 1985, to present a theory of NPOs based on 
uncertain demand). The opposite occurs in case, in order to 
distribute monopoly profits, prices are set below marginal 
costs. In fact, explicit distribution also has allocative 
effects whenever it is apportioned according to the volume 
of some type of transaction with members, and nonmembers are 
excluded from that type of transaction. This is a central 
theme in the economics literature on labour-managed firms, 
where it is known as the "Ward-Vanek effect" (see the recent 
reviews in: Bartlett and Uvalic, 1986, who also supply a 
rich bibliography; and Bonin and Putterman, 1987).
(9) The classification presented in table 1 differs in 
several respects from that proposed by Hansmann (1980). 
Apart from restricting his analysis to organizations serving 
consumers or aid recipients, he focuses on the single 
transaction that commits money to the organization (whether 
a purchase or a donation) rather than with the destination 
of the surplus connected with all the organization's 
transactions; in the case of donations this leads him to 
discuss the protection of donors' will (1980, p. 845) rather 
than the other side of the coin, i. e- the promotion of 
beneficiaries' interest-
(10) The distinction between mutual benefit and public 
beenfit NPOS is adopted in the New California Nonprofit 
Statute (see Hansmann, 1981 A, pp 583 - 584) and is analogous 
to the charitable-noncharitable distinction (see Simon, 
1987, p- 69).
(11) The motivation of nonprofit entrepreneurs, who, apart 
from the possibilities of abuses (disguised profit 
distribution), cannot expect any monetary gain from the 
organization they set up, represents a puzzling question for 
economists and requires a broader understanding of the 




























































































1983, and James, 1986)- I merely observe that, not only in 
public benefit NPOs, but also in noncapitalistic mutual 
benefit organizations, the entrepreneurial role is usually 
played de facto by a small group, while the participation in 
the privileged interest is highly dispersed among the 
beneficiary group. Thus, the drive to entrepreneurship 
cannot be explained by the entrepreneurs' participation in 
the privileged interest- Alternative explanations are 
needed, based on the desire to realize something valuable, 
the search for prestige or personal satisfaction, etc.-
(12) I am thus disregarding the (indirect) effects on the 
category that are due to modifications in the equilibrium of 
the market in question (these can be caused by both the 
different behavior of an organization pursuing different 
goals and by the possible modification in the number of 
competing organizations).
(13) The existence of an oligopolistic retail market is the 
traditional motivation for forming consumer cooperatives. 
See also Ben Ner's (1987) discussion of the advantage of 
forming worker cooperatives in face of an oligopsonistic 
local labour market- In fact, by forming an organization to 
their own benefit, the members of the category may also take 
advantage of any market power the organization is in a 
position to exert toward other categories (i-e. an attack, 
not a defense strategy)
(14) This is the rationale for vertical integration 
suggested by Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), who see 
mutual ownership of country clubs as a protection of a 
specific quasi-rent (in fact Hanmann's reference to 
"monopoly" in the case of clubs should be intended as ex­
post monopoly). The three authors also refer to specific 
human capital as an asset that needs particular protection; 
this argument is developed by Alchian and Woodward, who 
suggest that in some cases this is a good reason for the 
firm being managed to the benefit of workers (and controlled 
by them). Avoiding post-contractual exploitation on the part 
of the organization is indeed an important reason for 
investors controlling organizations.
(15) It is well known that informational asymmetries may 
prevent some markets from operating, despite the potential 




























































































(16) Among other examples (some of whom have already been 
mentioned), Hansmann (1987B) suggests that mutual savings 
banks, that are run by trustees to the benefit of 
depositors, have been formed for precisely this reason, i. 
e- to protect uninformed depositors from bankers engaging in 
exceedingly risky ventures (risk being the relevant 
"quality"). He obtains similar conclusions as to life 
insurance mutuals. This argument too applies to investors as 
well-
(17) An example is provided by property and liability 
insurance mutuals and saving and credit cooperatives. Here 
too risk is the relevant "quality" characteristic (notice 
that both adverse selection and moral hazard come into 
play). Hansmann notices that the best response to this type 
of market failure would be, if conceivable, that the 
organization "owned" the insured or the borrowers, rather 
than the other way round, which has to be seen as a second 
best option (1987B; see also 1985A).
(18) Dreze (1976) uses this result in search for a rationale 
for worker-managed firms-
(19) Ellman refers in particular to parent-controlled day 
care centers (1982, p- 1035). Hansmann, instead, never 
considers situations in which quality is inherently a 
multidimensional magnitude (in situations 3 and 4 quality 
could be simply considered as a scalar), notwithstanding 
that they fit into his definition of contract failure- 
Notice that situation 5 does not require opportunism on the 
part of the organization, that might even be indifferent to 
the choice of characteristics (as where the organization is 
the producer and all choices entail the same cost). 
Obviously, if there is room for opportunism the market 
solution is even less satisfactory. Ben Ner (1987, pp. 440 - 
441) applies this argument to the provision of workplace 
characteristics in examining the reason for the formation of 
worker cooperatives.
(20) See Hansmann (1981B) and Ben Ner (1986, case iii, as 
mentioned in section II), who make particular reference to 
the performing arts. Also in Ben Ner's case ii (indeed the 
least convincing), in order to improve the choice of 
quality, consumer organizations have to rely on demand 




























































































(21) This “marginal impact monitoring" problem (see Ellman, 
1982, p. 1009, who first uses this expression) applies for 
example to donor-supported educational broadcasting- Donors 
are concerned that their contribution may not be used to 
improve the quantity or the quality of programs-
(22) See the discussion in Gui (1985) with reference to 
worker cooperatives.
(23) Both the costs entailed by the degree of oversight 
exercised and by the remaining managerial slack have to be 
included (see Hansmann, 1987B, p- 17-21) -
(24) For a discussion of participation in voluntary 
organizations in the African context see Anheier (1987). 
See also Hansmann, 1980, p. 890-91-
(25) The inability of the category's members to start a 
successful initiative does not necessarily preclude the 
mutual benefit solution- In fact, the peculiar difficulties 
of the early stages can be overcome by (or with the aid of) 
outside entities, such as public agencies, philantropists, 
cooperative associations and so on- The pattern that sees 
outside support leaving room to self-governance is quite 
common in the history of non-capitalistic organizations. In 
a sense what is required for the viability of the mutual 
benefit form is the ability to successfully govern the 
organization once started- It can even result that in this 
second phase active member participation is not so important 
for continuation (this seems to be the case of the above 
mentioned life insurance mutuals; see Hansmann, 1985A).
(26) Some hints at this issue can be found in Hansmann 
(1987B, 1989), Krashinsky (1987, p. 123), Ben Ner (1986, p. 
108); see also as a general reference Olson (1965, p- 43).
(27) This is the theme repeatedly raised by the “property 
rights school" (see Steinberg, 1987, pp. 127-130, for an 
overview of their contributions).
(28) This notion is connected by Hart (1988) to the problem 
of ownership; however, it remains useful even when there is 
no owner, as in NPOs-
(29) There exist examples of private non-voluntary mutual 




























































































maintenance of agricultural infrastructures (e- g. Italian 
"consorzi obbligatori"). A similar situation occurs in 
condominiums.
(30) One might say that it depends on whether non members 
are considered as intended or unintended beneficiaries. See 
the debate between Hansmann (1985) and Ellman (1982) on 
whether members' contributions to business associations have 
to be seen as purchases or as donations- In such cases the 
two protecting mechanisms can fruitfully supplement each 
other-
(31) As mentioned above, Hansmann sees a correspondence 
between market power and cooperatives on the one hand, and 
contract failure and NPOs on the other. In a somewhat 
ambiguous passage Hansmann seems to consider control as an 
inferior solution to the enforcement of a nondistribution 
constraint as to the protection of beneficiaries' interests 
(1981 A, p. 597). In fact, with reference to cooperatives, he 
says that they are suitable for situations, such as those 
involving natural monopoly, in which simple contractual 
devices do not adequately protect the beneficiary group, 
"but in which direct patron control over the organization is 
sufficient for this purpose". The nonprofit corporation, he 
continues, is convenient "for situations -- such as those 
characterized by contract failure -- in which neither simple 
contractual devices nor direct control provide adequate and 
workable means by which patrons can police producers-.". I 
do not agree with the view that seems to be implicit in 
these sentences, namely that control on the part of the 
beneficiaries is not an adequate response to contract 
failure. Indeed, in many cases the costs of such control are 
prohibitively high. However, this does not depend on the 
type of market failure it should remedy (whether market 
power or contract failure). See also Hansmann, 1985 A-
(32) This is one of the possible effects of "cross- 
subsidization". See on this issue James (1986, p. 155), who 
is very concerned about the effective trustworthiness of 
NPOs, due to such possibility.
(33) It is surprising that Ellman does not see the 
similarity between donors and uninformed buyers, since 
"marginal impact monitoring" problems also arise in the 
second instance. In the example of the nursing care of an 




























































































paid is not only his or her enrolment by the caring 
organization, but also obtaining a treatment of higher 
quality.
(34) Consider for instance a public benefit organization 
controlled by those supporting it, say in the form of 
membership fees and voluntary work, a situation that is 
typical of small local charities or cultural organizations. 
In this case the main reason for imposing a formal 
nondistribution constraint is the fear that the majority of 
co-members might change their minds as to the goals to be 
pursued, with respect to the founding agreement. For this 
reason the nondistribution constraint is likely to be 
supplemented by other restrictions in the organization's 
charter as to the destination of its resources. Only to the 
extent to which the organization also relies on support by 
less informed contributors, can informational asymmetry 
also be a reason for imposing the nondistribution 
constraint•
(35) Hansmann, 1989, interprets this seemingly paradoxical 
situation in which workers bear the risk without having 
control as due, on the one hand, to the high cost of 
collective decision-making by large nonhomogeneous 
constituencies, and, on the other, to the fact that in such 
a way control is still not in the hands of a potentially 
adversarial category.
(36) I owe this example to a conversation with Renate 
Pollvogt and Manfred Glagow.
(37) In the spirit of Williamson (1985) these types of 
organizations might be viewed instead as particular
institutions of capitalist systems. Alchian and Woodward are 
particularly explicit in adopting this view (they go as far 
as to include even the family; 1988, p.76)). I do not think 
that this is useful, since such institutions are far from 
being typical of capitalism (as to NPOs in socialist 
countries see for example Neuberger, 1982).
(38) It has to be said that the statutes of some 
cooperatives, especially in the US, make them not much 
different from joint stock companies.




























































































distribution of net assets at dissolution, which is 
sensible, for instance, in the case of clubs. However, it is 
in conflict with the very idea of NPO. In fact, a coherent 
nondistribution constraint should imply that the 
organization's asset be devolved to organizations having 
similar purposes. Otherwise, its effect is simply to delay 
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